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AA defining contribution to the ‘varieties of capitalism’ (Voc) school of thought was the dependent economy category of Nölke and Vliegenthart (2009), by which the authors primarily meant the Visegrád countries. 
our hypothesis is that, with all of its merits, 
this typology errs by making an excessive 
generalization. Therefore, this study establishes 
a set of criteria to show the specificities of 
the Hungarian model of capitalism that 
existed from the 1990s through 2010 and its 
differences as compared to V3 countries. The 
period from 2008 to 2010 brought along a 
crisis that led to a change in terms of politics 
and economic policy aiming to change the 
Hungarian model of capitalism, which is why 
this analysis only extends to 2010.
first, our study presents the model of capi-
talism of dependent market economies, then 
analyzes how the characteristics of a depend-
ent economy came about – with particular 
attention paid to the dependent banking sys-
tem – in central European economies. After-
wards, it examines how stabilization in the 90s 
followed by privatization contributed to creat-
ing a dependent Hungarian economy. How-
ever, our analysis also shows that the Hungar-
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ian economy had numerous distinguishing 
characteristics compared to other dependent 
Visegrád economies. finally, we draw the les-
sons of a model of capitalism distinguished on 
the basis of our own set of criteria, pointing 
out the need to reinterpret in foreign literature 
the role of foreign capital on the real economy 
on the part of the recipient countries.
THE CHaraCTErISTICS OF dEPENdENT 
markET ECONOmIES – THEOrETICal 
INTrOduCTION
In a significant break from previous analyses 
discussing the different types of capitalism, 
Nölke and Vliegenthart (2009) started 
analyzing the market economies of the Vi-
segrád countries by emphasizing the effect 
foreign capital had in terms of shaping the 
economy, society and institutions. What 
distinguishes their model from the prevailing 
model opposing liberal and coordinated mar-
ket economies, which can only be applied 
to Visegrád countries to a limited extent, 
is that the coordination mechanism, the 
sources of investment, corporate manage-
ment, industrial sector connections, the 
education and training system, the ‘flow’ of 
innovation and the comparative advantages of 
the economy are defined by the dependence 
on foreign direct investments. (see Table 1).1 
furthermore, these economies have weak 
social conventions, their labor markets are 
only partially organized, and their system 
of innovation is weak (Koltay, 2010). This 
is the position all dependent economies are 
trapped in, in which they are all extremely 
vulnerable to external macroeconomic and 
financial shocks because of their exposure to 
foreign capital (stockhammer et al., 2015; 
Vliegenthart, 2010).2
The distinguishing characteristic of depend-
ent market economies is the dependence on 
the investment and other decisions of transna-
tional corporations (Nölke and Vliegenthart, 
2009; Vliegenthart, 2010). According to this 
model, in the process of creating social-eco-
nomic institutions, transnational corporations 
seek to create an institutional environment 
that will support their needs. for this, the 
weakness – compared to the West – of the reg-
ulatory and negotiating processes of central 
Europe form a good basis for them (Koltay, 
2010). corporations are also helped by the 
absence prior to 1989 of a class of local high-
capital stakeholders (Vliegenthart, 2010).
In a dependent economy, capitalism’s main 
mechanism of coordination is the system of 
decisions and hierarchies within transnational 
corporations (Vliegenthart, 2010). Because 
these corporations cause an extraordinary 
influx of capital into the economies of the 
central European region, transnational cor-
porations strive to maintain local subsidiar-
ies under strong hierarchical controls from 
their headquarters abroad (Gál, 2013; Nölke, 
Vliegenthart, 2009). In order to limit their 
exposure to the local economy, they develop 
their own practices of corporate management 
and financing, rejecting the practices of liberal 
and coordinated market economies (Nölke, 
Vliegenthart, 2009). Therefore, they get their 
funds not from the international capital mar-
ket or international banks, but from the parent 
company. This entails transnational companies 
operating in the region maintaining a rela-
tively closed management structure and don’t 
open them up to the possibility of outside con-
trol by shareholders (cornel, 2013). It follows 
from all of this that in this model, transna-
tional corporations impede improvements in 
human capital and production. They are not 
interested in allowing a generous public educa-
tion system to be created, therefore, they don’t 
invest in the enhancement of skills relevant to 
creating workforce innovation, because their 
economic success is based on low wages and 
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tax credits (Nölke, Vliegenthart, 2009; cor-
nel, 2013). furthermore, they import innova-
tion into central European economies from 
abroad, with transfers within the company.
THE CENTral ElEmENT 
OF a dEPENdENT ECONOmy 
IS a dEPENdENT baNkINg SECTOr
In a dependent economy, foreign corporations 
‘bring with them’ the banking sector serving 
their needs, thereby, their financing is 
discrete from the domestic real economy 
and its institutions (cornel, 2013). In these 
economies, it is not only the balance of 
outbound and inbound fDI that is disrupted, 
but also, as a result of this, the proportion of 
domestically owned and foreign owned actors 
in the banking sectors (Nölke, Vliegenthart, 
2009). A foreign-owned banking system – 
because of its behavior in financial crises – will 
represent another mechanism of dependence 
in the model of traditional dependent 
Table 1
The characTerisTics of liberal, coordinaTed and dependenT 
markeT economies






The mechanism of 
coordination distinguishing 
the system
Competing markets and formal 
agreements
Inter-company networks and 
organizations
dependence on hierarchies 
within transnational 
companies
The primary financial 
source of investments
domestic and international 
capital markets
domestic bank lending and 
internal funds created within 
the economy
Foreign direct investments and 
foreign banks
Corporate management External control and 
fragmented ownership 
structure
Internal control and 
concentrated ownership 
structure
Companies are controlled by 
the foreign headquarters of 
transnational corporations
Industrial connections Pluralistic, market-based; little 
collective bargaining
Corporatist, consensus-based; 
agreements extending to 
whole sectors or country-level 
agreements
remuneration of the trained 
workforce; company-level 
collective agreements
Education and training 
system
Importance of generic skills, 
high research & development 
expenditure
Importance of skills specific 
to a company or sector, 
specialized training
limited training options and 
funds used for further training
Innovation transfers based on markets and formal 
agreements
Importance of joint ventures 
and business organizations
Innovation transfer within 
transnational corporations
Comparative benefits of the 
system
radical capacity for innovation 
in the technology and service 
sectors
Incremental innovation of 
capital goods
assembly platforms of 
partially standardized products
Source: Nölke and Vliegenthart (2009)
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economies (cornel, 2013). This also manifests 
in the central European financial systems be-
ing controlled from Western financial centers: 
this is the reason why central Europe didn’t 
see the development of any fully fledged 
international financial centers, see Figure 1 
(Gál, 2013).
following the regime change, under the 
effect of the policy narrative of the Washing-
ton consensus, a foreign-owned banking sec-
tor quickly – but in no way as a result of a 
natural progression – formed in central Eu-
rope, see Figures 1 and 2 (Gabor, 2010; Gál, 
2016). By the 1990s, Western Europe saw 
the creation of capital surplus and intensify-
ing, strong market competition, many banks 
therefore looked to central European markets 
because of decreasing profit margins (cor-
nel, 2013; Vliegenthart, 2010). The available 
capital was welcomed with enthusiasm in the 
East, because based on neoclassical theories 
of modernization, they thought this was the 
factor required for the region to catch up eco-
nomically (Vliegenthart, 2010). Many lead-
ing economists of the day thought that shift-
ing ownership of the banking sector abroad 
would harden soft budget constraints, which 
should be considered a false narrative (Gabor, 
2012). Those arguing in favor of bank pri-
vatization said that irresponsible lending by 
publicly owned banks to publicly owned com-
panies needed to stop in order to prevent the 
resulting financial instability. They feared that 
publicly owned banks would end up being ac-
Figure 1
share of commercial banks by ownership 
(share of all bank lending)
Note: because of rounding, not all totals add up to 100.
Source: mihaljek (2007)
Latin America China and 
India
Rest of Asia Other emerging 
economies
Central Europe
State-owned bank                         Foreign bank                                  Domestic private bank
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quired by the national classes of oligarchs at 
rates far below market value – like in Russia 
and ukraine. They wanted to favor Eu coun-
tries to accelerate accession talks; they were at-
tempting to import a Western banking sector 
complete with fully new, modern technology; 
and finally, the wanted to put an end to the 
frustration of consumption from the time of 
state socialism with cheap and easily available 
consumer credit (cornel, 2013). The most im-
portant criterion was that foreign capital lent 
legitimacy to national governments, quickly 
improving consumption levels (Gabor, 2012).
The tone of experts, however, changed 
drastically when the crisis deepened in 2009 
(Gabor, 2010). At first, the IMf excluded the 
possibility that – instead of patient financing 
– short-term credit spread speculation prac-
tices by banks were what caused the crisis. At 
the same time, it became obvious that foreign 
financiers became a central European group 
of annuitants, whose profits far exceeded 
Western levels (Banai et al., 2011). This ‘ex-
tra’ profit was due to foreign actors using weak 
regulations to make foreign currency consum-
er lending widespread, especially in Hungary 
(Gabor, 2010).3 obtaining foreign annuity 
was based on ownership rights being trans-
ferred from local societies to foreign owners 
(Gál, 2013).
The banking system becoming foreign 
owned resulted in multiple adverse effects: 
the dependent banking system was character-
ized by ‘impatient financing’, which caused a 
decrease in sME lending according to Gabor 
(2010).4 consumer and real estate bubbles 
Figure 2
share of asseTs owned by foreign banks 
(2012–2013)
Source: Cull et al., 2017
no data available
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started to build up, therefore, breaking away 
from the real economy, foreign bank subsidi-
aries were able to generate higher profits than 
their parent companies back home (cornel, 
2013; Vliegenthart, 2010). The relative under-
development of small and medium enterprises 
in multiple countries of the region can also 
be traced back to foreign funds not appear-
ing in the (domestic) manufacturing sector: 
in the late 90s, foreign banks provided short-
term loans mostly to governments or served 
exclusively the financing of transnational cor-
porations’ manufacturing needs. According 
to Gabor’s data (2012), Romania’s corporate 
lending volume in 2008 was the same as in 
1994 to 1996, in the era of domestic, pub-
licly owned banks.5 And while in 2000, 56 per 
cent of loans went into industry, in 2008, only 
20% did so, with corporate lending taking a 
backseat to consumer and real estate lending 
(cornel, 2013). In the meantime, between 
1994 and 2007, in the post-socialist banking 
sector, foreign ownership went from nearly 0 
per cent to 80 per cent in terms of bank assets 
(the average proportion was 25 per cent in the 
Eu and 15.5 per cent in the eurozone) (Gál, 
2013).
As such, a dependent banking system can 
have its drawbacks: Prasad et al. (2006) state 
that those non-industrialized countries that 
relied more heavily on foreign financing didn’t 
grow faster on the long term than those that 
relied less heavily on it. In many cases, this 
foreign-owned banking sector – absent appro-
priate policies – created a risk-based competi-
tion instead of long-term investments aimed 
at improving capacity and efficiency (Badics-
szikszai, 2015). It financed speculative trans-
actions (Vliegenthart, 2010) or investments 
implementing a low-wage model.6 After 2008, 
the question of whether in a time of bank pri-
vatization crisis, this led to a deepened reces-
sion came to the forefront again (fungácová 
et al., 2011).
THE SPECIFICITIES OF THE HuNgarIaN 
mOdEl OF CaPITalISm
Stabilization: the deterioration 
of  the domestically owned economy
The mainstream stabilization narrative 
considered it important to maintain a strict 
monetary policy and to limit the loans given to 
large enterprises previously owned by the state. 
The liquidity crisis thus created contributed 
to banks beginning to limit even short-term 
lending. Therefore, it was in the middle of 
the economic shock of the transition that the 
entire Hungarian entrepreneurial sector was 
left without financing (Katona, 2017). In 
1999, in Hungary, 27 per cent of corporate 
loans were connected to small and medium 
enterprises, which is a quarter of the Eu15 
level at the time. By 2007, this had grown to 
53 per cent, which was still low compared to 
the economic significance of sMEs (Árvai, 
2002; csubák, fejes, 2014; Naaborg et al., 
2003). Due to informational asymmetries 
and their weak bargaining positions, domestic 
sMEs were only able to access loans at a 
higher rate than foreign corporations, between 
1995 and 2000, the Hungarian banking 
sector supported the domestic rise of foreign 
corporations (csubák, fejes, 2014). At the 
end of the 90s, half of Hungarian companies 
operated without loans (Várhegyi, 2002). 
A strict bankruptcy law, favoring foreign 
capital and strict financing terms together 
contributed to Hungary being the only count-
ry where the share of foreign corporations in 
the total value added exceeded 50 per cent by 
2011 (Table 6).
In the late 90s, Hungary was not tracking 
with middle-income countries in deepening 
its financial intermediation system and devel-
oped a financing model typical of low-income 
countries based on a high return on assets 
(RoA) and low penetration. Lending by do-
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mestic banking remained low by international 
standards, thereby creating an intermediation 
system that was based ‘neither on banking nor 
on the capital markets’. foreign corporations 
arriving in the country benefited not only 
from favorable loans by foreign banks, but 
were also granted tax exempt status (Katona, 
2017). Domestic corporate lending remained 
low in the 90s even though the banking sec-
tor became foreign owned, thereby granting 
access to the abundant funding available in 
Western markets (Naaborg et al., 2003).7
In the 2000s, foreign banks achieved sev-
eral times of their parent company’s RoA in 
the Hungarian market. Interestingly, local, 
domestic banks had an information advan-
tage: their tacit knowledge owing to their fa-
miliarity with local economic actors resulted 
in them providing more loans to domestic 
sMEs than foreign banks and their results 
were higher than those of foreign actors, be-
cause they had accumulated several decades’ 
worth of knowledge (Banai et al., 2011). The 
excess earnings of foreign banks compared to 
their parent company could also be explained 
by the establishment in Hungary of an oli-
gopolistic market pricing.8 Domestic consum-
ers were not price sensitive, therefore, instead 
of lower prices, banks tried to expand their 
clientele via higher marketing and network-
building costs and risk-based competition 
(Banai et al., 2010).9 As a result, the margin 
on consumer loans were double that of the 
eurozone, therefore – unlike Western Eu-
rope – Hungarian banks made most of their 
income from interests (Várhegyi, 2002).10 
foreign banks transferred 30 to 40 per cent 
of their profits immediately back to their par-
ent companies, investing the rest in order to 
expand the speculative lending boom.11 The 
loan-to-deposit ratio of foreign banks in Hun-
gary, contrary to domestically owned banks, 
was extremely high by international standards 
(Banai et al., 2011). In the 2008 crisis, foreign 
banks in Hungary continued to perform well 
by international standards: in several cases, 
foreign banking groups owed the entirety of 
their profits to the central European market 
(Banai et al., 2011). The foreign owned pro-
cyclical banking system became the primary 
source of macroeconomic risks and the deep-
seated 2008 economic recession in Hungary 
(Banai et al., 2011).
As a result of early, radical stabilization 
measures that differed from other Visegrád 
countries, the Hungarian-owned portion of 
the economy, mainly small and medium com-
panies suffered significant losses. It was Hun-
gary where the dual structure of the economy 
became the most pressing issue, which is one 
of the traits of Hungary’s ‘extremely’ depend-
ent economy. Between 1992 and 1996, this 
number was 8640 in the czech Republic, 
21,759 in Poland, but 41,727 in Hungary. 
That means that in proportion to the popula-
tion, we had five times as many companies that 
had to shut down as the czech Republic and 
seven times as many as Poland (Antal, 2005). 
The fact that foreign banks only started pro-
viding loans to sMEs later, in the early 2000s, 
could have played a role, which resulted in 
domestic actors not getting any support dur-
ing the long-lasting early period of the transi-
tion (Table 2). While in the czech Republic 
and Poland, in 2014, sMEs regularly made up 
more than 50 and 90 per cent of exports re-
spectively, this number barely reached twenty 
per cent in Hungary, meaning that even after 
2008, less than 1 per cent of Hungary’s com-
panies, mostly foreign owned corporations, 
accounted for four fifths of exports. Major-
ity domestically owned companies’ share of 
exports was also the lowest in Hungary in 
2014 at 20 per cent, with the czech Republic 
clocking in at 60 and Poland and Germany at 
40 per cent (see Table 6). This imbalance was 
already present by the end of the 90s (see Table 
3). This is why the Hungarian model of capi-
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talism differs from other dependent Viseg-
rád economies, representing a special case of 
those. The Hungarian dependent economy 
displays more unfavorable indicators than the 
V3 countries not just in the financial sense, 
but also in terms of its real economy.
Privatization: the creation 
of  a foreign-owned, dual economy
‘It is specific to Hungary – you will find 
few examples of this even in the developed 
countries of continental Europe – that in the 
course of privatization, the state divested a 
host of public utility services (natural gas and 
electricity providers, waterworks) to foreign 
investors’ – György (2017) points out. This 
is well illustrated by the fact that, even by 
international standards, the Hungarian 
economic policy generated exceptional income 
from privatization: the cumulative income 
from privatization, in terms of GDP, was 30 
per cent between 1989 and 2000 in Hunga-
ry, while in slovakia, the czech Republic and 
Poland, an amount equivalent to 10 to 15 per 
cent of the GDP was added to the budget by 
privatization (Zidek, 2014). As such, acting 
as a pioneer of privatization, Hungary gave 
an early and supportive welcome to foreign 
investors looking to acquire large Hungarian 
corporations (Myant, 2018).
on top of privatization representing twice 
the amount in terms of GDP, Hungary was 
also distinguished by the methods and means 
of privatization (see Table 4). In V3 countries, 
Table 3
share of foreign companies in indusTry aT The end of The 1990s, 
%
employment rate investments sales exports
Czech republic 27 53 42 61
Hungary 47 82 73 89
Poland 29 63 49 59
Source: berend (2009)
Table 2
The makeup of commercial lending in The Visegrád counTries, 
%
government corporate household
1999 2003 2004 1999 2003 2004 1999 2003 2004
Czech republic 6 31 25 83 45 45 12 25 30
Poland 5 6 7 62 53 46 33 31 46
Slovakia 29 49 49 64 37 34 7 14 17
Hungary 43 13 9 49 57 57 8 30 32
Note: because of rounding, not all totals add up to 100.
Source: mihaljek (2007)
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economic policy strived to prevent foreign ac-
tors from acquiring direct ownership in the 
privatized companies of strategic sectors. Ac-
cording to Baksay et al. (2003), Hungary was 
the only country typified by divestment to 
foreign actors despite slow, internal privatiza-
tion having a similar effect in terms of increas-
ing efficiency. Hungary is the only case where 
they mention uncertain social backing and 
suspicions of corruption.
The distinguishing characteristics 
of  the dependent Hungarian economy
Hungary’s peculiar stabilization and 
privatization created conditions that made 
it possible for an economic and ownership 
structure typifying dependent economies and 
an extreme type of a dependent economy to 
be established earlier than in other Visegrád 
countries. starting in the second half of the 
90s, Hungary counted as a leader in terms of 
attracting fDI in the region (Table 5). fDI 
per capita grew to its highest value in the 
Visegrád countries, 4.5 times higher than it 
was in slovakia. In terms of GDP, Hungary’s 
inbound fDI in 1999 was three times higher 
than slovakia’s. This became possible because 
Hungary’s economic policy made it its 
primary objective to improve the operating 
environment of fDI, the economic policy was 
based on devising a growth model driven by 
fDI in both the financial sector and the real 
economy.
Multiple indicators show that Hungary 
maintained the highest level of inbound fDI 
even later on. This is also what shows up in the 
net foreign assets as a proportion of the GDP 
(Novokmet, Piketty, 2018). In this regard, as 
in others, Hungary can be considered as being 
in an exception position (Figure 3). Propor-
tion of net foreign assets as a yearly average 
between 1993 and 2015: It was 23.1 per cent 
in the czech Republic, 38.7 in slovakia, 45.4 
in Poland, but 81.9 in Hungary. The net for-
eign assets indicator is a good illustration of 
why the Hungarian economy is distinct from 
the Visegrád countries: on one hand, a more 
dual economic structure is created with a high 
share of foreign ownership, on the other, the 
debt of the economy’s actors reached excep-
tionally high levels. The highest relative in-
flux of capital in the region did not result in 
Table 5
foreign ownership in The counTries of The region aT The end of The 90s
country Total fdi 
between 1989 
and 1999 (in 
billions of 
dollars)
Total fdi per 
capita (in 
dollars)
Total fdi as 
a percentage 













Czech Republic 14.9 1456 28 40 26 65
Poland 20.0 517 13 74 40 54
Slovakia 2.1 370 10 22 6 27
Slovenia 1.4 700 7 31 5 16
Hungary 18.1 1664 34 42 32 76
Source: Várhegyi (2001)
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the highest increase in efficiency and did not 
manifest as the most significant annual GDP 
increase (Table 6).
A characteristic of foreign-owned depend-
ent economies is that compared to Western 
economies, a larger proportion of property 
income flows abroad. In 1993, the difference 
between the GDP and the GNI in terms of 
percentage points started increasing sharply: 
the spread grew by nearly 6 per cent in 1999, 
whereas it remained under 2 per cent in the 
V3 countries between 1994 and 2000 (Fig-
ure 4). We see a similar image when it comes 
to net foreign property income: from 1995 
to 2008, an average foreign property income 
equivalent to 6 per cent of the GDP left the 
Hungarian economy, while this number was 
only 2.9 per cent in the V3 economies (No-
vokmet, Piketty, 2018). As early as 1998, 6.1 
per cent of the GDP was leaving the Hungar-
ian economy, which was another sign that the 
Hungarian model of capitalism deviated sig-
nificantly from the V3 countries (figure 4).
Hungarian public debt exceeded the debt of 
V3 countries both in decades before and after 
the regime change. At the same time, Poland 
secured the cancellation of 50 per cent of its 
debt both with private and public lenders in the 
1990s, thereby separating as early as the begin-
ning of the 1990s the path of Polish and Hun-
garian net foreign assets, see Figure 5 (György, 
2017). While the difference was negligible in 
1992, between 1993 and 2007, the propor-
tion of Polish net foreign assets amounted to 
roughly half of the Hungarian value. This also 
contributed to net foreign property income 
being twice as high in Hungary as in Poland 
between 1995 and 2007.
Figure 3
neT foreign asseTs as a proporTion of The gdp  
(Visegrád counTries, percenTage)
Source: Piketty, Novokmet (2018)
Poland         Czech Republic
Hungary         Slovakia
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Table 6
The mosT imporTanT characTerisTics of The hungarian dependenT economy
hungary poland slovakia czech 
republic
Financial characteristics
Proportion of foreign currency loans as a percentage of loans to the 
private sector (2008, %)
65 34 19 9
loan-to-deposit (2008, %) 156 115 83 83
Proportion of foreign funds as a percentage of the balance sheet total 
(2008, %)
26 7 5 10
Share of FdI going to the real estate, rental and commercial services 









Net interest rate spread (2000–2007) 4.50 3.90 3.52 2.99
rOa (2000–2007, %) 1.73 0.64 1.26 1.27
rOE (2000–2007, %) 19.37 4.37 16.54 17.32
Financial deregulation (2000–2005) 0.96 0.85 n.a. 0.90
gdP–gNI spread (1993–2007, % of gdP) – 4.4 – 1.4 – 1.3 – 2.8
Net foreign assets (1993–2007, % of gdP) – 73.5 – 35.6 – 24.4 – 13.2
Interest expenditure on public debt (1995–2007, % of gdP) 5.7           2.7   
(2000–2007)
2.6 1.0
Net foreign property inc. (1995–2007, % of gdP) – 5.9 – 1.9 – 3.2 – 3.2
Non-performing loans (2008–2016, %) 11.4 4.5 4.9 4.9
Properties of the real economy
gdP growth (gdP per capita, PPP, as a percentage of the Eu average, 
growth in percentage points, between 1995 and 2002)
8 4 6 –3
gdP growth (gdP per capita, PPP, as a percentage of the Eu average, 
growth in percentage points, between 2002 and 2008)
4 8 17 11
Share of foreign corporations in total value added (2011) 51.9 35.1 38.2 42.9
Export share of SmEs (%, 2014) 17.19 85.72 N/a 53.66
Export share of majority domestically owned corporations (%, 2014) 19.79 40.00 N/a 59.00
Wage rate in the manufacturing sector (Change as a percentage point 
of the gdP, 1995–2015)
– 17.73 – 11.48 3.27 – 0.92
Wage rate premium of domestic corporations (difference between 
wage rate of foreign corporations and domestic corporations)
– 12.53 – 2.82 2.83 0.2
average wage (in 2016 dollars, PPP-based, as a percentage change 
between 1995 and 2010)
40.34 48.35 81.25 68.28
Participation rate (ages 15 to 64, average of 1994 to 2007) 59.87 65.48 69.44 71.28
Note: We indicated in parentheses when we specified data specific to a given year or the average of the values of a given time period.
Sources: based on Central bank of Hungary (2014), World bank, Piketty and Novokmet (2018), ImF, ameco, Eurostat, OECd, Podkaminer 
(2013) and myant (2018)
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Figure 5
neT foreign asseTs (lefT)  
and inTeresT paymenTs (righT) in Terms of gdp
Source: Piketty, Novokmet (2018), Eurostat
Figure 4
gdp–gni spread and neT foreign properTy income  
(daTa as a percenTage of The gdp)
Source: Piketty-Novokmet (2018)
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Hungary’s early and radical privatization 
served the otherwise avoidable purpose of us-
ing that income to repay its previous loans. Af-
ter the temporary effects on the financial mar-
kets of Polish debt relief, Poland’s international 
perception and credit rating remained sustain-
ably identical or nearly identical from the end 
of the 1990s all the way to the 2008 financial 
crisis, while Hungary had already built the 
foundation of its own dependent economic 
model. In terms of GDP, the czech Republic’s 
debt servicing to its lenders was 3 percentage 
points lower, while Poland’s was 2 percentage 
points lower after 1995 for nearly 15 years 
(György, 2017). In terms of GDP, compared to 
the czech economy, Hungary had to produce 
4.05 percentage points more to service debts 
between 1995 and 2015. In Hungary, between 
1993 and 1999, interest expenditure exceeded 
education, culture and healthcare spending, 
thus, Hungary’s dependent economic model 
also had an unfavorable effect on the most im-
portant growth factor, the regeneration of hu-
man capital (György, 2017).
The uniqueness of the Hungarian model 
of capitalism within the Visegrád countries is 
also reflected by the management of the finan-
cial sector and public finances and the policy 
prerogatives afforded to it. The Hungarian 
banking sector was the first to become foreign-
owned and Hungarian economic policy per-
formed the largest deregulation in the newly 
foreign-owned banking system. The IMf’s fi-
nancial liberalization index between 1995 and 
2005 in Hungary displayed an average indicat-
ing a higher degree of liberalization than not 
only the czech Republic and Poland, but also 
several developed countries (see Figure 6). Hun-
Figure 6
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gary engaged in more drastic deregulation in 
the financial sector than Greece, plunged into 
a financial crisis in 2008, or than south Korea 
known for its miraculous dynamic growth, but 
also surpassed central Europe’s Romania, Bul-
garia and Poland.
under the effect of financial deregulation, 
Hungary become the most financially vulner-
able economy of the region (for a summary 
of the characteristics of this dependent Hun-
garian economy, see figure 6).12 following 
the turn of the millennium, Hungary was the 
only one of the Visegrád countries where the 
share of foreign currency loans reached 65 
per cent, with Poland displaying a share that 
was half of this value, slovakia one third and 
the czech Republic one sixth. As a result of 
the risk-based competition that emerged in 
Hungary’s oligopolistic banking market, the 
loan-to-deposit ratio grew to twice the level of 
slovakia and the czech Republic. The credit 
expansion therefore manifested mainly in for-
eign currency loans, which increased the vul-
nerability of the Hungarian banking system 
via three separate channels: the mechanisms of 
(1) currency mismatch, (2) increased financ-
ing risks and (3) maturity mismatch (central 
Bank of Hungary, 2014). The domestic for-
eign currency funds were not sufficient for the 
expansion of foreign currency lending, which 
is what increased the reliance on other, includ-
ing foreign, sources of foreign currency. The 
weight of foreign funds thus grew from 17 to 
25 per cent between 2003 and 2008, which 
corresponded to 30 per cent of the GDP 
(central Bank of Hungary, 2014).
It is due to these processes that the Hungar-
ian economy ended up in a public financial 
crisis earlier than other Visegrád countries, as 
early as 2006 (Matolcsy, 2015). Between 2002 
and 2006, the primary balance can be identi-
fied as being the cause of increasing debt (Kic-
sák, 2015). Growth slowed beginning in early 
2006 even though the global economy grew 
by 5 per cent in 2007 and German growth 
fed – thanks to the mechanisms of depend-
ent economies – the growth of other depend-
ent Visegrád economies. But the Hungarian 
economy’s growth was already below the Eu 
average at this time (Parragh, 2014). Beyond 
the unsustainable budgetary policy, it was the 
extremely high level of foreign currency based 
mortgage debt of households that made it 
so that by the time the global financial cri-
sis came around, Hungary was considered the 
most vulnerable economy in the region (Bak-
say, Palotai, 2017). The processes, which were 
reminiscent of Latin America’s dollarization, 
had a very significant impact on Hungary 
compared to other Visegrád countries, which 
demonstrates that radical differences can be 
identified between the Polish economy, which 
weathered the global recession while main-
taining its growth – but which literature states 
is dependent – and the Hungarian model of 
capitalism, which experienced a downturn as 
early as 2006. Hungary was the second coun-
try to request the assistance of international 
organizations in 2008 (Baksay, Palotai, 2017). 
As early as the fall of 2006, Hungary had to 
revise its 2005 convergence program, because 
its authenticity had been questioned by the 
council of finance Ministers of the Eu (Po-
litical capital, 2006).13
one of the reasons the profitability of banks 
exceeded czech and slovak rates was because 
the deregulated banking market saw conduct 
that seriously distorted competition as early as 
the middle of the 2000s. The oEcD (2010) 
and the European commission (2007) both 
pointed out that Hungarian banks made it dif-
ficult to change banks to achieve annuities and 
earnings that were high even by international 
standards. foreign banks also distorted com-
petition by product tying, while worsening 
informational asymmetry: the costs, charges 
and commissions of bank products became 
opaque to consumers. concentration and in-
 focus – successes and Risks in the Hungarian Economy 
22  Public Finance Quarterly  2019/1
stability grew in tandem: a macroprudential 
and a consumer protection problem arose at 
the same time, because the risks were passed 
onto the consumers by an under- and de-
regulated banking system (Pawłowska, 2015). 
Because of this, between 2008 and 2016, the 
share of non-performing loans in Hungary 
is double the value found in other V3 coun-
tries (oEcD, 2010). At the end of 2017, the 
Hungarian banking system still achieved the 
highest return on assets (RoA) within the Eu, 
while loans to the private sector in terms of 
GDP in Q1 2018 was only higher than in Ro-
mania (Banai, Nagy, 2018).
THE rOlE OF FOrEIgN CaPITal 
IN THE rEal ECONOmy
According to Andrianova et al. (2010), between 
1995 and 2007, public ownership of banks 
displayed a significant, positive correlation 
amongst the countries of the world with 
long-term economic growth rates. A good 
example of this is Hungary, where an early 
application of the principles of the Washing-
ton consensus still only provided a small-scale 
and temporary benefit in terms of catching 
up with Eu economies (Table 6). one of the 
possible reasons for this positive correlation is 
that in economies with weak institutions and 
informational asymmetry, the state must take 
on a decisive role in developing the economy 
(Andrianova et al., 2010). Degryse et al. 
(2009) reveal in their analysis that (1) at first, 
foreign banks in Poland only gave loans to 
transparent, i.e. mostly foreign corporations; 
(2) the country’s greenfield foreign banks 
provided more foreign currency loans than 
domestic banks, (3) foreign banks provide 
shorter-term loans than domestic ones. As 
a result, foreign banks present a higher cre-
dit risk and can significantly limit lending in 
times of crisis.
The production-improving effect of foreign 
ownership can be misconstrued due to the fact 
that foreign investors mostly buy the most 
productive and profitable companies. once 
you control for these investors appearing in 
industries and companies with the highest 
potential of productivity, the positive effect of 
fDI’s on the target country’s productivity can 
be refused (fons-Rosen et al., 2012). Fons-
Rosen et al. (2012) only found fDI-related 
productivity ripple effects in Western Euro-
pean economies and not in central European 
countries, but only in corporations that are 
not direct competitors of foreign investors. In 
order for the positive effects of the influx of 
foreign capital to manifest, man other condi-
tions must be met [technological development 
of the recipient country, health status of the 
population, the properties of market competi-
tion or regulation policies (fons-Rosen et al., 
2012)]. contrary to industry investments, it 
is difficult to justify expecting a positive effect 
from domestic service sectors (water provi-
sion, trade, financial sector, apartment rentals) 
becoming foreign-owned, because this can re-
sult in wage rates decreasing in service sectors 
(Podkaminer, 2013).
It is easier to measure the effect of foreign 
capital on the income situation than its effect 
on productivity. In the Hungarian dependent 
economy, the excessive role of foreign capital 
compared to other Visegrád countries entailed 
a drastic decrease in wage rates (Table 6). Be-
tween 1995 and 2015, the wage rate of the 
manufacturing sector decreased by 17.7 per 
cent in Hungary. The cause lies in the disman-
tling of the sME sector and the prevalence of 
foreign investments in production structure: 
while in slovakia and the czech Republic, 
domestic corporations’ wage rates are higher 
than those of foreign corporations, in Hunga-
ry, domestic corporations’ wage rates are 12.5 
percentage points lower than foreign corpora-
tions. This demonstrates that in a dependent 
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economy, the potential productivity-improv-
ing effect of foreign capital only presents in 
real wages to a limited extent, because these 
effects can be negated by the strengthened 
bargaining power of foreign capital owner-
ship on the market. What made debt-driven 
consumption in Hungary a necessity was that 
GDP growth and improvements in productiv-
ity only had a limited impact on household 
wage growth, an economic policy that favored 
foreign capital resulted in the evolution of 
productivity and real wages separating, while 
the return rates of the financial sector were the 
highest in the region. This also contributed to 
participation rates in Hungary being over five 
percentage points lower than in Poland and 
more than ten percentage points lower than in 
the czech Republic (Table 6).
Hasan et al. (2014) say that economics still 
don’t have a grasp of the relationship between 
bank ownership and lending to sMEs. In light 
of this, the Hungarian banking sector becom-
ing foreign owned in the 90s can be consid-
ered premature. Hasan et al. (2014) state that 
local cooperative banks provide more loans to 
domestically owned sME actors of the econ-
omy than large foreign banks. They refer to 
the interviews of Haas and Naaborg (2006) 
made with foreign bank executives in central 
Europe, which revealed that these banks pro-
vided almost the entirety of their loans to the 
foreign corporate sector and to a more lim-
ited extent to local large corporations in the 
2000s. foreign banks only began to lend to 
the local sME sector after a long period of 
integrating into the local institutional envi-
ronment, but they continued to focus on lo-
cal households to a larger extent than domes-
tically owned banks (De Haas et al., 2010). 
Gormley (2010) in turn showed that when 
foreign banks entered the local Indian mar-
kets, sMEs’ access to loans deteriorated: while 
the volume of loans increased, the new loans 
were provided to the most profitable corpora-
tions. According to Mamatzakis et al. (2017), 
the best results on the chinese market are 
achieved not by the foreign- and state-owned 
banking system, but the domestically owned 
private banking system.
CONCluSIONS
While the category of dependent economies 
established in 2009 by Nölke and Vliegenthart 
pointed out facts regarding the transition of 
the Visegrád countries that had previously 
been ignored – foreign ownership defining 
social-economic-institutional structures –, 
the transition of the Hungarian economy was 
implemented with a significantly different 
timing and practices compared to other Vise-
grád countries. This unique economic policy, 
which executed privatization too prematurely, 
to an extent too large, with too little strategic 
outlook and regulation, can be held liable for 
the Hungarian economy becoming dependent 
and being the only one of the Visegrád countries 
to require international assistance in 2008. In a 
manner that is peculiar in the region, the bank-
ing system, rather than being an institutional 
system managing and allocating risks, became 
the main cause of risks.
The concept of dependent economy also re-
fers to the fact that the Hungarian economy is 
a model with low added value and based on 
low wages, which can also be considered sub-
ordinated to Western countries in value chains, 
but also because of its growth dynamics being 
based on debt. In our study, we have pointed 
up the connection points between financial 
variables and the dual real economy as the two 
dimensions of a dependent economy: a crisis of 
the first deepened the crisis of the domestically 
owned real economy, decreasing wage rates.
Domestic and international organizations 
and literature often had a more favorable 
opinion of the Hungarian transition than of 
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the region, while the external exposure and 
issues of the economic structure showed a 
different image. This contradiction makes it 
necessary to introduce the new concept of a 
dependent economy in Hungary’s case. After 
2010, Hungary can attempt to create the in-
stitutional system of a new model of capital-
ism from a much tougher starting position 
than Visegrád countries, since Hungary’s de-
pendent economy can be considered a special, 
extreme case of a dependent economy. As a 
matter of policy conclusion, one might pon-
der how to increase the sovereignty of this de-
pendent economy and converge institution-
ally towards the dependent economies of the 
V3. This, however, is also partly a matter of 
political science, because other than abandon-
ing the growth model of a dependent econo-
my, the state building work that was not done 
in the 90s must also take place.
Notes
1 The first generation of Voc literature called ‘classical 
school’ was created by Hall and soskice (2001) to 
describe developed countries. To this day, they 
classify central European economies as export 
oriented liberal market economies, belonging to 
the same category as developed Western economies 
(Hall, 2017). Analyses of intermediate models 
of capitalism were encouraged by the increasing 
visibility, starting in 2005, of the differing dynamics 
of Visegrád countries attempting to catch up with 
the West and of Hungary grinding to a halt. This 
previous typology approached the East from a Wes-
tern perspective, that’s why it omitted foreign capital 
from its model as the most important factor from the 
point of view of the Visegrád region, even though it 
had been featured in multiple analyses penned by 
central European pairs of authors (King, szelé-
nyi, 2005; Bohle, Greskovits, 2012; Drahokoupil, 
Myant, 2010, 2011).
2 Gereffi and Evans (1981) pointed out, through the 
example of Mexico and Brazil, that a dependent path 
of development carries with it increased external 
vulnerability and is less resistant to crises.
3 The economic transition led by international 
organizations was based on the neoclassical-
monetarist approach followed by the IMf, which 
considered establishing free market pricing its main 
priority, because it assumed that this would lead to an 
efficient allocation of resources. Kornai’s soft budget 
constraint became a cornerstone of this narrative. 
conversely, representatives of the Post-Keynesian 
school, considered neglected, thought the primary 
objective of the transition to be full employment 
(Gabor, 2012).
4 The dependence is well illustrated by the fact that 
in 2001, Austrian banks derived one third of their 
profits from central European countries, while 
only investing ten per cent of their assets there 
(Vliegenthart, 2010).
5 In the czech Republic, by 2004, only 15 per cent 
of loans went to the manufacturing sector, less than 
those given out to households and the government 
(Gabor, 2012).
6 The dependent banking system based catch-up 
strategy attempts to replicate the successful catch-
up of East Asian countries, but using tools that are 
the exact opposite of their models (Gabor, 2012). 
In emerging Asian countries, in developed Western 
countries and in Japan, financial systems continue 
to be domestically owned. furthermore, certain ser-
vice sectors – such as the retail network – are also 
retained by domestic interests (in order to be able to 
absorb less skilled domestic labor). In central Eu-
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ropean countries, however, these sectors were ceded 
in their entirety to foreign interests. In the influx of 
foreign capital, a difficult-to-justify double standard 
was leveled: for instance, in many cases, the influx of 
Russian capital was limited (Podkaminer, 2013).
7 The shift of ownership abroad started in the second 
half of the decade, because up until the middle of 
the 90s, a special permit was required for foreign 
ownership of a Hungarian bank to exceed 25 per 
cent (Zídek, 2014).
8 Especially when it came to retail loans. In 2007, the 
European commission determined, that the foreign-
owned banking sector in Hungary was maintaining 
high prices artificially by anti-competitive collusion, 
abusing its market position and making changing 
banks more difficult in order to achieve higher 
profits. In a closed market, there is a high barrier 
to entry and the system of products, charges and 
commissions is opaque. According to the analysis, 
the frequency of changing banks is a good indicator 
of strong competition, but this was very low (oEcD, 
2010; European commission, 2007).
9 An aggressive market penetration strategy meant 
that banking subsidiaries were offering far riskier 
products to their customers than in their home 
countries (somai, 2016). What’s more, they often 
flouted regulations in their home countries: Austrian 
authorities, for instance, cautioned strongly against 
foreign currency lending practices (Banai et al., 2010).
10 In 2000, net non-interest income made up 26 per 
cent of all banking income in Hungary, whereas the 
Eu average was more than 40 per cent (Várhegyi, 
2002).
11 In 2010, 30.7 per cent of fDI went to the real estate 
sector and commercial activities in Hungary. In the 
czech Republic, this number was 16.2, in Poland 17.6 
and in slovakia 10.9 per cent (Podkaminer, 2013).
12 This Hungarian model of capitalism, which was 
extremely dependent compared to other Visegrád 
countries can be designated as a ‘subprime economy’. 
subprime lending meant providing loans to low-
income, risky people, often with a bad credit history, 
which sets households on a financially unsustainable 
path. The expression can be used in reference to the 
entirety of the Hungarian economy because of the 
foreign currency lending issue (which only took on 
a defining role in Hungary out of all V4 countries) 
and an unsustainable growth based on debt, which 
created a public financial crisis as early as 2006. Hun-
gary was the only country that needed to request the 
IMf’s assistance because of the 2008 crisis. As such, 
the designation can also be used in reference not only 
to households, but also to public finances.
13 Multiple Hungarian macroanalysts have put forward 
that ‘the downturn in Hungary started as early as 
2006’ and that ‘if the international crisis had occurred 
in 2006, the country probably wouldn’t have been 
able to stay afloat and there wouldn’t have been a 
shred of doubt that only the state (the overspending 
government) was responsible for the consequences 
(including a significant devaluation of the currency, 
large-scale capital flight and the increase in forint-
based interest rates)’ (Mellár, 2013; oblath, 2009).
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